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Automation is a big concern in modern societies in view of its widespread impact on many
socioeconomic issues including income, jobs, and productivity. While previous studies have
concentrated on determining the effects on jobs and salaries, our aim is to understand how
automation affects productivity, and how some policies, such as taxes on robots or universal
basic income, moderate or aggravate those effects. To this end, we have designed an
experiment where workers make productive effort decisions, and managers can choose
between workers and robots to do these tasks. In our baseline treatment, we measure the
effort made by workers who may be replaced by robots, and also elicit firm replacement
decisions. Subsequently, we carry out treatments in which workers have a universal basic
income of about a fifth of the workers’ median wages, or where there is a tax levy on firms
who replace workers by robots. We complete the picture of the impact of automation by
looking into the coexistence of workers and robots with part-time jobs. We find that the
threat of a robot substitution does not affect the amount of effort exerted by workers. Also,
neither universal basic income nor a tax on robots decrease workers’ effort. We observe that
the robot substitution tax reduces the probability of worker substitution. Finally, workers that
benefit from managerial decisions to not substitute them by more productive robots do not
increase their effort level. Our conclusions shed light on the interplay of policy and workers
behavior under pervasive automation.
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The rapidly growing wave of automation is submitting oursociety to large changes of profound consequences.Undoubtedly, the availability of a cheaper, more efficient
workforce of robots will affect every aspect of our socioeconomic
life, from welfare to job opportunities and conditions through
markets and businesses. In this context, there is a growing con-
cern about optimal policy responses to the challenges associated
with those social and economic effects. Indeed, there is an
emerging research field on this topic showing the impacts of
automation on society. For instance, Frey and Osborne (2013)
estimate that 47% of current US jobs are at risk from automation.
The World Bank (2016) also estimates that about 57% of current
jobs in the whole OECD could be automated in the coming
decades. On the other hand, Arntz et al. (2016) argue that these
figures could be overestimated in so far as they do not take into
account the fact that workers will specialize in hard-to-automate
jobs; in that case, we would experience a lower, but still very
relevant, loss of 9% of jobs within OECD countries. This and
related research points to the sizable effects that automation may
have on the job market.
A specially relevant question has been posed by Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2017) who analyzed the impact of robots and auto-
mation on jobs and salaries. They estimate that for each extra
robot per 1000 workers, jobs will decrease between 0.18% and
0.34% and salaries will also decrease between 0.25% and 0.5%.
Further, the study (Autor and Salomons, 2018) considered the
impact of automation on employment and salaries with data from
19 developed countries over four decades. They find a net positive
effect on employment, even if the direct effect on the affected
sector is negative. On the other hand, the net effect on salaries is
negative. For this reason, they argue that policies should concern
themselves with the distributional aspects of technological change
rather than with job losses.
These previous studies have concentrated on determining the
effects on jobs and salaries. To shed light on the impact of
automation from a complementary viewpoint, we here aim to
understanding the effects of automation on productivity, and also
to determining the effects of some proposed policies, such as taxes
on robots or universal basic income, on productivity and on
firms’ decisions. Addressing these issues from a standard
empirical methodology is not possible, as those policies have not
been trialed in the field. Also, productivity is notoriously difficult
to measure under standard field conditions because of lack of
control. Therefore, we have designed an experiment in which
workers make productive effort decisions, and managers can
choose between workers and robots to do these tasks. In our
baseline treatment, we measure the effort made by workers who
may be replaced by robots who are on average more productive
than themselves, and we also monitor firm replacement decisions.
Once the baseline results are established, we look at how they
change when workers can access a universal basic income of
about a fifth of the workers’ median wages, as in a pilot experi-
ment in Finland (Kangas et al., 2019). We then go on to study the
effect of taxes imposed on firms that replace a worker by a robot.
In a last treatment, we consider a situation in which workers and
robots coexist with the option of choosing to work part-time.
Our specifically designed experimental setup allows us to draw
several conclusions that can be relevant for policy making on this
issue. First, and contrary to what standard theoretical arguments
would predict, the threat of a robot substitution does not affect
the amount of effort exerted by workers. Second, neither universal
basic income, nor the tax levied on firms when they replace a
worker by a robot decrease workers’ effort, again in contradiction
with theoretical predictions. Third, the robot substitution tax
does indeed reduce the probability of worker substitution in
accordance with its intended goal. Interestingly, workers that are
not substituted by a more productive robot do not increase their
effort subsequently, as theories of reciprocal altruism would
suggest. In light of these results, the issue on the impact of
establishing universal income or robot taxes need further con-
sideration both by researchers and policy makers.
Experimental design and methods
To address the issue of the impact of automation on productivity
under different policies, we recruited 900 individuals to take part
in an experiment with 9 treatments. The sample were 59% female,
and 98% university students. The mean age was 21, with a
minimum of 19 and a maximum of 30. In our recruitment we
tried to recruit students from diverse fields to be representative of
future graduate labor markets. Instructions in Spanish, exactly as
they were provided to the participants, and their translation into
English, are provided in the Supporting Information.
The experiment was designed as follows: We begin by asking
the participants to work on a set of tasks (counting letters in a text
and adding up integer numbers, see SI) and as a result they
receive a monetary payment as a function of their performance.
Except in the control treatment, after this first stage participants
may go to a second one or they may be substituted by a robot in a
manner we discuss below. If they do proceed to the second stage,
they perform a similar task and accumulate their corresponding
payment, their earnings from the experiment being the sum of the
money obtained in the two stages plus a show up fee. If they are
substituted, they neither perform any task nor receive any pay-
ment from this second stage. In the control treatment, partici-
pants always proceed to the second stage. All this is made known
to the participants from the beginning.
Preliminary pilots and the control treatments were used to
obtain the effort distribution in the first task, from which random
robots were sampled in the rest of the treatments as we discuss in
the following. The replacement of robots by workers is done in
two different forms, giving rise to two corresponding treatments:
exogenous and endogenous. In the exogenous treatment, a robot
is randomly selected to be compared with every worker. Robots
are individually and randomly associated to each different indi-
vidual. Then, the output of the participant is compared with that
of its assigned robot, which is random but on average superior to
that of an average participant (calibrated in pilots prior to the
experiment, as well as with the control treatment). If the assigned
robot has higher productivity than the participant, with prob-
ability 90% the latter is substituted and does not proceed to the
second stage.
In the endogenous treatment, the participants are randomly
classified as type A or type B independently of their performance
in the first stage. Subjects of type B play the role of employees and
subjects of type A play the role of managers. Each A subject has
several B subjects of whom she is responsible. Before the second
stage starts, A subjects decide, knowing the production of each of
the B subjects she manages, and the productivity of a randomly
assigned robot, if the subject is replaced or not. Managers also
work during the second stage so participants in the lab can not
identify who is a manager. A subjects earn the result of their own
production plus an amount that is proportional to the production
of their teams, while B subjects only receive the earnings from
their own effort. In addition to these treatments, both in the
exogenous and endogenous condition we have a number of ses-
sions in which all participants receive a universal basic income
that is independent of their productivity. The value of the
universal basic income used in the experiment is obtained
dividing by 5 the median output in the control treatment.
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This computation follows the spirit of the pilot experiment in
Finland where median salary is about 3000 euros a month and the
amount of basic income in the experiment was about 600 euros
(Kangas et al., 2019). Therefore, given that median output of
subjects’ work in the control treatment was 16.15 euros, we
introduced a basic income of 3.4 euros in our experiment. For
comparison, the median earnings of participants in our experi-
ment were approximately 12 euros, so the basic income was a
significant contribution when applicable, but not the main one. In
the endogenous treatment, we also carried out sessions in which
the replacement of a worker by a robot was subjected to a tax.
Finally, another variant of the endogenous treatment allowed
managers to offer workers in their team a part-time contract.
Details of the implementation of the tax and on the part-time
contract are included in the SI. The combination of all these
treatments allows us to study the independent or combined
effects of the different policies (tax, basic income, and part-time
work) both when the replacement is endogenous and when it is
exogenous (where that is relevant).
In summary, the nine treatments considered were the following
ones:
● T0, Baseline (control group): 60 subjects.
● T1, Endogenous without basic income and no tax: 120 sub-
jects.
● T2, Endogenous with basic income and no tax: 120 subjects.
● T3, Endogenous without basic income and tax: 120 subjects.
● T4, Endogenous with basic income and tax: 120 subjects.
● T5, Endogenous without tax and option to work part-time:
120 subjects.
● T6, Endogenous with tax and option to work part-time:
120 subjects.
● T7, Exogenous without basic income: 60 subjects.
● T8, Exogenous with basic income: 60 subjects.
The presentation of our design would be incomplete without a
discussion of the limitations of our approach. Obviously, a lab
experiment does not reproduce totally real life. At the lab we are
making a stylised projection of the decision frame similar to the
one that people should face in normal life. This process of
abstraction allows to disentangle the significance of few variables
instead and of a total representation of real decision; however, it
can be argued that it is too far away from the real context to draw
conclusions. However, the large body of literature on experimental
economics has shown that the results from the lab do offer
insights about human behavior in daily life contexts (Levitt and
List, 2007). In any event, most of the information available on the
issue of interest here comes from surveys which are even further
separated from the respondent’s actual situation. Another feature
to take into account is about the monetary incentives that
experimental subjects could take. While this amount may be
regarded as small, it is typically calculated so average earnings are
around 15 euros per hour of participation, so it is quite a fair
payment for general participants. Finally, the amount of the
sample might be a problem, but in our case we have 900 indivi-
duals which should be enough to detect the effects under scrutiny.
Theoretical framework
In order to provide a reference frame for our experiments, we
begin by developing a theory of the experiment we have just
described. To begin with, the total output of agent i in period j is a
function of their idiosyncratic productivity bi, and their effort in
the period eij. We assume the money equivalent cost of effort is
quadratic. The total income of an agent is output minus effort,
and we also assume agents are risk averse, so their utility will be a
concave function of income U ð Þ: There is no discounting as
there is virtually no time between periods in our experiment. In
addition, we consider that the probability that an agent is not
replaced by a robot in the second stage is a function of her output
in the first one, p biei1ð Þ. With this, and including when present
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The maximization of this utility as a function of the effort exerted
in the first period, ei1, requires
U 0 biei1  12 e2i1
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bi  ei1ð Þ
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p0 biei1ð Þbi ¼ 0
ð1Þ
which can be written compactly as
F ei1;Bð Þ ¼ 0














p biei1ð Þ þ B
 
p0 biei1ð Þbi ð3Þ
Fei1 ¼ U
00
biei1  12 e2i1
 
bi  ei1ð Þ2  U 0 biei1  12 e2i1
 
þU 00 biei2  12 e2i2
 
p biei1ð Þ þ B
 
p0 biei1ð Þbið Þ2
þU 0 biei2  12 e2i2
 






Clearly Fei1 < 0 to satisfy second order conditions for max with
respect to ei1 Then the sign of ei1 Bð Þ is the sign of FB so that
ei1 Bð Þ< 0 if U is concave. This leads to as to a first hypothesis
based on our theoretical approach:
Hypothesis 1. Effort in the first period decreases with the amount
of universal basic income B.
Now, to consider the effect of the probability of being replaced,
pðbiei1Þ; suppose that pðbiei1Þ depends parametrically on a
parameter q. So we have p biei1; qð Þ: Then the first order condition
(Eq. 1) can be written compactly as
F ei1;B; qð Þ ¼ 0
so that
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Clearly Fei1<0 to satisfy second order conditions for max with
respect to ei1 Then the sign of ei1 Bð Þ is the sign of Fq so that
∂ei1 B;qð Þ
∂q <0 if U is concave. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Effort in the first period decreases with the prob-
ability of not being replaced.
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In summary, our theoretical framework suggests that basic
income makes workers exert a lower amount of effort, and also
that, when a tax makes her less likely to be replaced, she also
decreases her effort level. We will turn to the comparison of these
predictions, which on the other hand are quite reasonable in
principle, with the results of the experiment.
Results
Our first result is that the threat of substitution by robots does not
change the productivity of workers, in contradiction with
hypothesis 2. Figure 1 shows the production of the first phase for
all participants in each of the 9 treatments. As can be seen from
the graph, even if the dispersion varies across treatments, the
means and medians are located almost perfectly on a horizontal,
straight line. A t-test of difference in means also shows there are
no statistical differences between the outputs of the first phase in
the different treatments. In particular, there is no difference
between the output in the first phase of the baseline treatment,
when workers cannot be substituted by robots, and all the other
treatments, when the substitution is possible. Hence, we conclude
that there is no effect on effort on the threat of robot substitution.
It is important to note for reference that the amount of points
earned during this phase is approximately 17 points averaging
over all treatments.
Looking now at the production in the second phase, depicted
in Fig. 2, corresponding to those workers who were not sub-
stituted by robots, we observe an increase in the average output of
13.5% with respect to phase 1, with the maximum growth taking
place in the treatment without basic income or tax at 18.5%, and
the minimum growth, 9.5%, for the exogenous treatment without
basic income. The increase is quite homogeneous between
treatments as can be seen from Fig. 2.
Regarding the effects of universal basic income or taxes, from
Fig. 1 we can conclude that the output in the first phase of those
treatments is statistically the same as that observed in the baseline
treatment. This implies that there is no disincentive to effort
arising from either basic income or the tax on robots. This is in
stark contrast with hypothesis 1 from the standard theoretical
benchmark discussed in the previous section. As far as the uni-
versal basic income is concerned, further support comes when
data are aggregated, as shown in Fig. 3, which compares the
output of subjects in the first phase for treatments with and
without basic income and suggests there are no differences. The
t-test for differences in means again confirms there are no sta-
tistical differences in output between the two types of treatments.
On the other hand, the bottom panel of Fig. 3 presents the
production of participants in the first phase of endogenous
treatment without basic income and without tax with the output
of the first phase without basic income and with tax. The amount
implemented as tax in the experiment was 3.4, to be compared
with the average points earned in the baseline production phase
of 17. As with the basic universal income, there are no statistical
differences between the output of subjects when there is a tax and
when there is not. Indeed, Fig. 3 has the same shape as the
previous one, showing the similarity between the treatments with
and without taxes.
Another conclusion that arises from our experimental data is
that a tax on the substitution of workers reduces the likelihood
that workers are replaced. It has to be borne in mind that one of
the policies that have been suggested in this situation of auto-
mation (Abbott and Bogenschneider, 2018; Guerreiro et al., 2017)
consists precisely in the application of a tax when a human job is
replaced by a robot. We measure the impact of the tax using a
regression analysis. One of the variables is a dummy for the
presence (or not) of a tax (variable TAXYes), whereas another is a
dummy for the presence of basic income (variable RBYes), and
finally we include a dummy for gender (variable SexMMale). The
results from the logit regression are shown on Table 1. The
negative sign of the variable TAXYes shows that the probability of
replacement is lower when there is a tax. Another variable takes
into account the difference in productivity between the robot and
the human (variable I(ProdRob-Prod1)): its coefficient is positive,
which means that the higher the productivity difference between
robot and human, the higher the replacement probability. The
ratio between the coefficients of the two variables is roughly 4.5,
indicating the productivity differential necessary to compensate a
unit tax for the use of a robot. The 95% confidence interval of the
ratio of coefficients (found via bootstrapping) is (1.06, 8.18).
We have also considered the possibility that workers that have
not being replaced by a robot because of a managerial decision
increase their effort in return. There is a wide literature in
anthropology, sociology and behavioral economics, (see, e.g.,
Fig. 1 First phase production by treatment. Production is computed as the number of earned points during the first phase of the experiment, and the
horizontal axis indicates the different treatments carried out. Treatments are labeled as follows: T0, Baseline; T1, Endogenous without universal basic
income and tax; T2, Endogenous M2 with universal basic income and without tax; T3, Endogenous M2 without universal basic income and with tax; T4,
Endogenous M2 with universal basic income and tax; T5, Endogenous M3 without universal basic income and tax; T6, Endogenous M3 without universal
basic income and with tax; T7, Exogenous without universal basic income, and T8, Exogenous with universal basic income. Boxes show the mean of the
distribution as a dot and the median as a line, while the box itself indicates the second and third quartiles. Dots are outliers, defined as points beyond 1.5 the
interquartile range, and whiskers show the range of points that are not outliers.
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Cabrales and Ponti, 2015), suggesting that we may expect a
beneficial act to be reciprocated. Thus, managers not replacing
workers when the randomly assigned robot is more productive
could be interpreted as one of those actions that deserve a reci-
procation, and indeed, the worker can do so by making more
effort. One would also expect this to happen only in endogenous
treatments, as workers should not feel the need to reciprocate a
decision made by machines. Figure 4 shows, however, that there
are no significant differences in phase 2 for workers that are
chosen not to be substituted in exogenous versus endogenous
treatments. The t-test of equality in means accepts the null with a
p-value of 0.6825. This shows that workers do not reciprocate
their managers when they have not been replaced by a robot.
A more detailed study of the individual behavior of type
A subjects, i.e., of managers does not reveal distinct patterns of
behavior. Table 2 collects the rates of substitution for the different
sub-cases of the endogenous treatment. One would expect that
managers would replace the worker every time that the robot is
more efficient, and never replace her otherwise. However, in some
cases, reaching about 40% in the condition with tax, the manager
does not do that, showing probably some concern for the welfare
of the worker. The opposite situation is perhaps more puzzling.
When the worker is more efficient, she is sometimes replaced,
about 15% of the time, reaching an astonishing 30% when there is
neither income nor tax. Another way of looking at these data is
the plot in Fig. 5. As can be seen, in the positive side of the
horizontal axis, corresponding to workers being more efficient
that their candidate replacing robot, the pink column, repre-
senting no replacement, is dominant. On the negative side, when
the robot is better than the workers, the bars are predominantly
green, which indicates that the worker is replaced. Nevertheless,
the pink bars are equally distributed for not so large negative
differences. One would think the replacement is guided by a
threshold strategy, but for this to be true, the pink bars on the
Fig. 2 Comparison of the production in the two phases by treatment. Production is computed as the number of earned points during the two phases of
the experiment, and the horizontal axis indicates the different treatments carried out. Labels are as in Fig. 1, and the additional 1 or 2 refer to the first and
the second parts of the experiment. Boxes are as in Fig. 1.
Fig. 3 Comparison of aggregated outputs in treatments with and without basic income or tax. Top: Output in the first phase for treatments with basic
income and without basic income. Bottom: Output in the first phase of treatments with and without tax, when there is no basic income. Boxes and labels
are as in Fig. 1.
Table 1 Results from the logit model.
Estimate Std error z value Pr >jzjð Þ
Intercept −0.38940 0.29910 −1.302 0.1929
I(ProdRob-Prod1) 0.14342 0.02095 6.846 7.58e–12***
TAXYes −0.64306 0.31249 −2.058 0.0396*
RBYes 0.10227 0.30313 0.337 0.7358
SexMMale 0.29599 0.30890 0.958 0.3380
Significance: ***0,001; **0,01; *0,05.
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negative side would have to be decreasing and even disappear as
the difference becomes larger which is not the case until the
difference becomes very large. Finally, as one can see in Fig. 5, the
cases of part time or shared jobs (light blue) are scarce, and do
not show any specific pattern.
Discussion
In this work, we report the results of an experiment designed to
test the effect of the possibility of being replaced by a robot on the
workers’ productivity, and also to find out whether different
policies are relevant in this area. We have found that workers do
not produce more when they can be substituted by robots and
that the two policies considered (universal basic income or tax on
robots) do not affect the workers’ productivity. Of these two
policies, a tax levied on robots does reduce the probability of
worker replacement, although the behavior of managers in our
experiment is not easy to understand. Finally, the possibility of
part-time jobs is practically never used in our setup.
Let us first discuss some of these results in light of our theo-
retical framework. Our first result runs contrary to our Hypoth-
esis 2. It can nevertheless be accommodated in the framework.
Note that the hypothesis 2 is a direct consequence of Eq. (5). But
if one looks deeper into that equation, one can see (Eqs. (7) and
(6)) that a low value of U
00
:ð Þ with respect to U 0 :ð Þ, that is a very
concave utility (high risk aversion) would lead to a low enough
response in effort that would not be picked up in the data. High
levels of risk aversion are not uncommon in environments with
high potential losses like the financial markets (Cohn et al., 2015)
and in agricultural economies (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009). A
similar thing occurs with our result that universal basic income
Fig. 4 Production does not increased in the second phase when workers are not substituted. Aggregate production in the second phase for endogenous
treatments 8 without basic income, but with or without tax) compared to production in the second phase for the exogenous treatment, where decisions are
taken exogenously. Boxes and labels are as in Fig. 1.
Fig. 5 Workers that were replaced, or not, by a robot, or half a robot as a function of the difference in production between the worker and the robot
randomly assigned to replace her. Green, number of instances in which the worker was replaced. Pink, number of instances in which the worker was not
replace. Blue, replacements keeping a part-time contract.
Table 2 Rates of substitution by robots.
Lower Higher
Substituted No Substituted No
No income no tax 72.2% 27.8% 29.2% 70.8%
Income 84.2% 15.8% 9.1% 90.9%
Tax 59.6% 40.4% 7.7% 92.3%
Income and tax 63.8% 36.4% 15.4% 84.6%
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does not decrease workers’ effort. It is contrary to Hypothesis 1, a
consequence of Eq. (2). But from Eqs. (4) and (3) one can also see
that high risk aversion can easily explain the apparent lack of
response by the workers. Other mechanisms are indeed possible
to explain those observations. A different model, where agents
have multiple priors and maximin preferences as in (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989) and (Klibanoff et al., 2005) could also explain
those results. Our experimental setup is not designed to test
between these alternative theories, but we hope that our results
will encourage future research in this direction.
Behavioral economics can explain why managers do not always
automate when the robot is more productive, as the workers lose
more than the managers gain. A simple expansion of our theo-
retical framework where agents have egalitarian (social) pre-
ferences as in (Cabrales and Ponti, 2015) would take account of
this result. This could be exacerbated in our case, because the
worker is substituted by a machine. This is important because the
loss of a job is very important for personal identity issues (see,
e.g., Schob, 2012).
It is also interesting to discuss another of our observations,
namely the increase in production in the second phase with
respect to the first one. Of course, a component of this is the
contribution of more efficient robots, but as shown in Fig. 2, the
production by human participants also increases. This result may
arise for two reasons: It can be explained because of a learning
effect of participants (even though the complexity of second
period task was higher than the first) or because of a selection bias
(the most productive workers are those that proceed to the sec-
ond phase).
As far as the effect of the universal basic income or of taxes is
concerned, we want to stress that our conclusions are drawn for
specific values of those policies. In particular, we have only tested a
basic income equivalent to one fifth of the output, so we cannot
claim that a larger basic income would have no effect. More
research would be needed to ascertain that effect. The effect of taxes
is more likely to be representative of the general behavior, albeit it
can also be expected that a very low tax may not be effective.
Also, we cannot discern with our experiment the impact of
automation on employment. Our experiment confirms that not
all jobs for which robots are more productive get replaced even in
our case, where there is no issue of quality of work. In addition,
we cannot take into account the impact of lower costs, and the
higher sales, within other jobs in the same industry, or the general
equilibrium effects. The literature we discuss in the introduction
suggests that even if many jobs are replaced, the global effect on
employment will be small or even positive.
We have discussed two policy instruments, “robot taxes” and
universal basic income, to mitigate the effects of automation on
employees whose skills are made redundant. Our conclusion is
that taxes are effective to deter employers from automating some
jobs, and universal basic income protects the income of workers
without making them less productive. But both instruments have
wider implications. Universal basic income is far costlier, as it
affects (by definition) all citizens, and it requires significant
increases in taxation to fund it (Hoynes and Rothstein, 2019). It is
thus best seen as a policy in the context of the general fight
against inequality, rather than something narrowly related to
automation. On the other hand, “robot taxes” are targeted, and
cheaper. They affect just the workers and firms involved in
automation. But it also slows technical change, which can be a
major problem for society in the long-run. Thus, they seem
sensible only “while the current generations of routine workers,
who can no longer move to non-routine occupations, are active in
the labor force,” as Guerreiro et al. (2017) show.
In conclusion, this work represents a first step in the
exploration of human reaction to automation and in the study of
policy decisions that can have an impact on the process. Our
results suggest that the general worker population may not be
well aware of the advancement of automation, and therefore more
information should be provided so they can make decisions on
their own careers within a proper context. Perhaps more
importantly, it turns out that the universal basic income does not
decrease productivity; if confirmed by future research, this points
out to a means to alleviate the circumstances of workers affected
by automation. On the other hand, this policy can coexist with a
tax on robots that would have two benefits: reduce the substitu-
tion rate, and provide funds to support the universal basic
income. All together, our results indicate that there is much room
for action by policy makers to modulate the automation process
and its negative consequences.
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